Energy Regulation, Roll Call Votes and Regional Resources: Evidence from Russia
AbstractThis paper investigates the relative impact of regional energy production on the legislative choices of Russian Duma deputies on energy regulation between 1994 and 2003. We apply Pooleâ€™s optimal classification method of roll call votes using an ordered probit model to explain energy law reform in the first decade of Russiaâ€™s democratic transition. Our goal is to analyze the relative importance of home energy on deputiesâ€™ behavior, controlling for other factors such as party affiliation, electoral mandate, committee membership and socio-demographic parameters. We observe that energy resource factors have a considerable effect on deputiesâ€™ voting behavior. On the other hand, we concurrently find that regional economic preferences are constrained by the public policy priorities of the federal center that continue to set the tone in energy law reform in post-Soviet Russia.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics in its series Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt8dz4q3vd.
Date of creation: 22 Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Energy regulation; energy roll law reform; energy resources; roll call;
Other versions of this item:
- Theocharis N. Grigoriadis & Benno Torgler, 2006. "Energy Regulation, Roll Call Votes and Regional Resources: Evidence from Russia," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-25, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Theocharis N. Grigoriadis & Benno Torgler, 2006. "Energy Regulation, Roll Call Votes and Regional Resources: Evidence from Russia," Working Papers 2006.146, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Q40 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- P27 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects
- P37 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal
- P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
- R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fleck, Robert K. & Kilby, Christopher & Fleck, Robert K., 2000.
"Reassessing the Role of Constituency in Congressional Voting,"
Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series
51, Vassar College Department of Economics.
- Fleck, Robert K & Kilby, Christopher, 2002. " Reassessing the Role of Constituency in Congressional Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 31-53, July.
- Poole, Keith T. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "Are legislators ideologues or the agents of constituents?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 707-717, April.
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