Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kirstein, Roland
  • Cooter, Robert D

Abstract

Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. However, if a team members assumes the role of an "internal" Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. External Anti-sharing may induce the team members to choose efficient effort. The paper presents possible applications of Anti-Sharing: while internal Anti-Sharing may provide an explanation for the existence of senior (or managing) partners, external Anti-Sharing leads to a new theory of the incorporated firm.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4441r9r1.pdf;origin=repeccitec
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics in its series Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt4441r9r1.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 24 Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt4441r9r1

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Boalt Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720
Fax: (510) 642-3767
Email:
Web page: http://www.escholarship.org/repec/blewp/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: D23; L23; C72;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kirstein, Roland & Cooter, Robert D., 2007. "Sharing and anti-sharing in teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 351-356, September.
  2. Margaret M. Blair, 2001. "Team Production Theory and Corporate Law," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 27, pages 88-95.
  3. Mukesh Eswaran & Ashok Kotwal, 1984. "The Moral Hazard of Budget-Breaking," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 578-581, Winter.
  4. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.
  5. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
  6. Choi, Yoon K., 1993. "Managerial incentive contracts with a production externality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 37-42.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt4441r9r1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lisa Schiff).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.