Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process
AbstractAlthough antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. Much of antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firmsâ€™ attempts to restrain improving trade between their rivals and customers. In this way, antitrust protects firmsâ€™ and customersâ€™ freedom to trade to their mutual betterment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics in its series Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt0xg2h885.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Edlin, Aaron & Jennings, Richard & Farrell, Joseph, 2011. "Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt5gx9n3tf, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Aaron Edlin & Joseph Farrell, 2011. "Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process," NBER Working Papers 16818, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sjostrom, William, 1989. "Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and Empty Core Model s," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1160-79, October.
- Roman Inderst & Greg Shaffer, 2010. "Market-share contracts as facilitating practices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(4), pages 709-729.
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