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Stability and Change in International Customary Law

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  • Fon, Vincy
  • Parisi, Francesco

Abstract

While customary law is capable of creating universally binding rules, the rules that govern its formation allow states to gain an exemption from emerging norms of customary law by remaining persistent objectors. This form of objection requires the objecting state to take express action to oppose an emerging practice by making its objections widely known before the practice solidifies into a binding rule of custom. Likewise, after the custom is formed states have an opportunity to express an objection or depart from it. In this latter case, the departing state does not obtain an exemption from the binding custom unless other states acquiesce to its departure. We model the effects of persistent objector and subsequent objector doctrines in the formation and change of customary law when heterogeneous states are involved.
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Suggested Citation

  • Fon, Vincy & Parisi, Francesco, 2003. "Stability and Change in International Customary Law," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt0t46t705, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt0t46t705
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, 2003. "Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 76-92, March.
    2. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1993. "An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms," Working papers 9323, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, "undated". "The Economics of Legal Harmonization," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1149, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    2. Schaefer Hans-Bernd, 2020. "Laudatio: Francesco Parisi," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-9, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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