This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Roland Kirstein (Universitat des Saarlandes)
Neil Rickman (University of Surrey)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We present, for the first time, a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. Recognizing the financing constraints that British cost rules may impose on litigants, these new contractual arrangements combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these "Third Party Contingency" (TPC) contracts. Signing a TPC contract can make filing a suit credible and may increase settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only of mutual benefit to the plaintiff and the third party when the case settles out of court. We also find that the mere availability of TPC's may generate the above strategic effect.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=blewp
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics in its series Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series with number 1072.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 23 Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdl:oplwec:1072

Note: oai:cdlib1:blewp-1072
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Boalt Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720
Fax: (510) 642-3767
Email:
Web page: http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barry Nalebuff, 1987. "Credible Pretrial Negotiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 198-210, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gravelle, Hugh & Waterson, Michael, 1993. "No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(420), pages 1205-20, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, 1999. "The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 261-286, September. [Downloadable!]
  4. Landes, William M, 1971. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 61-107, April.
  5. Waldfogel, Joel, 1998. "Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 451-76, October.
    Other versions:
  6. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. repec:pal:gpprii:v:25:y:2000:i:2:p:251-261 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Contingent fees and litigation settlement1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 295-317, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 165-188.
    Other versions:
  10. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1998. "Negative Expected Value Suits," NBER Working Papers 6474, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1996. "A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, January.
  13. Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997. "Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 509-520, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 379-385. [Downloadable!]
  2. Emons, Winand, 2005. "Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Roland Kirstein, 2009. "Optimal Delegation in Nash Bargaining," FEMM Working Papers 09001, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
  5. Roland Kirstein, . "Anti-Teilen in Teams," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1127, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dieter Schmidtchen, . "Wozu Strafrecht? Another View of the Cathedral," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1041, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  7. Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The yearly budget of IDEAS is exactly $0: it relies entirely on volunteer work.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.