This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Credence Goods Monopolists Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Winand Emons (University of Bern, Switzerland)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
With a credence good, consumers are never sure about the extent of the good that they actually need. Experts such as doctors and lawyers, as well as auto mechanics and appliance service-persons (the sellers) not only provide the services, but also act as the expert in determining the customer's requirements. This information asymmetry between buyers and the seller creates strong incentives for the seller to cheat. We analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non-fraudulent seller behavior.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics in its series Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series with number
1060.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 03 Jan 1997Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdl:oplwec:1060Note: oai:cdlib1:blewp-1060Contact details of provider: Postal: Boalt Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720 Fax: (510) 642-3767 Email: Web page: http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Liu, Ting, 2006.
"Credence Goods Markets with Conscientious and Selfish Experts ,"
MPRA Paper
1107, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Sep 0007.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Suelzle, Kai & Wambach, Achim, 2002.
"Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Olivier Bonroy & Christos Constantatos, 2008.
"On the use of labels in credence goods markets ,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics ,
Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 237-252, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2003.
"Price Discrimination in Markets for Experts' Services ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Kyle Hyndman & Saltuk Ozerturk, 2008.
"Consumer Information in a Market for Expert Services ,"
Departmental Working Papers
0801, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Anania, Giovanni & Nistico, Rosanna, 2003.
"Public Regulation As A Substitute For Trust In Quality Food Markets. What If The Trust Substitute Cannot Be Fully Trusted? ,"
2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa
25924, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Thomas Liebi, 2002.
"Trusting Labels: A Matter of Numbers? ,"
Diskussionsschriften
dp0201, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
[Downloadable!]
Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2004.
"Conflicts of Interest, Information Provision and Competition in Banking ,"
Economics Working Papers
760, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Heijnen, P., 2007.
"Informative advertising by an environmental group ,"
CeNDEF Working Papers
07-02, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
[Downloadable!]
Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2001.
"On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists. Or Where are the Problems with Credence Goods? ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3016, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Antony Dnes & Neil Rickman, 1998.
"Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals ,"
European Journal of Law and Economics ,
Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-265, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2005.
"Price discrimination via the choice of distribution channels ,"
Economics working papers
2005-08, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
[Downloadable!]
Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2005.
"Experts vs. discounters: consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods ,"
Economics working papers
2005-09, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2007.
"Experts vs. Discounters: Consumer Free Riding and Experts Withholding Advice in Markets for Credence Goods ,"
Working Papers
2007-21, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
[Downloadable!] Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2009.
"Experts vs. discounters: Consumer free-riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 15-23, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Auriol, Emmanuelle & Schilizzi, Steven, 2003.
"Quality Signaling through Certification. Theory and an Application to Agricultural Seed Market ,"
IDEI Working Papers
165, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!]
Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2005.
"Experts vs Discounters: Competition and Market Unravelling When Consumers Do Not Know What they Need ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5242, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Thomas Liebi, 2002.
"Monitoring Eco-Labels: You Can Have Too Much of a Good Thing ,"
Diskussionsschriften
dp0207, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? Authors registered on the RePEc Author Service receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .