This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Collaboration Structure and Information Dilemmas in Biotechnology: Organizational Boundaries as Trust Production

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Lynne Zucker (University of California, Los Angeles)
Marilynn Brewer (Ohio State University)
Michael Darby (University of California, Los Angeles)
Yusheng Peng (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Scientists who make breakthrough discoveries can receive above-normal returns to their intellectual capital, with returns depending on the degree of natural excludability, that is whether necessary techniques can be learned through written repons or instead require hands-on experience with the discovering scientists or those trained by them in their laboratory. Privatizing discoveries, then, only requires selecting trusted others as collaborators,most often scientists working in the same organization. Within organizational boundaries, incentives become aligned based on repeat and future exchange, coupled with third-party monitoring and enforcement.We find that high value intellectual capital paradoxically predicts both a larger number of collaborators and more of that network contained within the same organization. Specifically, same-organization collaboration pairs are more likely when the value of the intellectual capital is high: both are highly productive 'star" scientists, both are located in top quality bioscience university departments, or both are located in a firm (higher ability to capture returns). Collaboration across organization boundaries, in contrast, is negatively related to the value of intellectual capital and positively related to the number of times the star scientist has moved, Organizational boundaries act as information envelopes: The more valuable the information produced, the more its dissemination is limited. In geographic areas where a higher proportion of coauthor pairs come from the same organization, diffusion to new collaborators is retarded.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=issr
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA in its series Institute for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series with number issr-1001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Aug 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdl:issres:issr-1001

Note: oai:cdlib1:issr-1001
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://repositories.cdlib.org/issr/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This item is featured on the following reading lists:
  1. Technology Assessment
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Pamela Tolbert & Lynne Zucker, 1994. "Institutional Analyses of Organizations: Legitimate but not Institutionalized," Institute for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series issr-1004, Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  3. Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby & Jeff Armstrong, 1999. "Intellectual Capital and the Firm: The Technology of Geographically Localized Knowledge Spillovers," NBER Working Papers 4946, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
  5. Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby & Marilynn B. Brewer, 1999. "Intellectual Capital and the Birth of U.S. Biotechnology Enterprises," NBER Working Papers 4653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Michael R. Darby & John R. Lott, Jr., 1975. "Qualitative Information, Reputation, and Monopolistic Competition," NBER Working Papers 0095, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Jerry A. Hausman & Bronwyn H. Hall & Zvi Griliches, 1984. "Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship," NBER Technical Working Papers 0017, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Geertz, Clifford, 1978. "The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 28-32, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Origin," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 3-17, Spring.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Nicola Lacetera, 2003. "Incentives and spillovers in R&D activities: an agency-theoretic analysis of industry-university relations," Microeconomics 0312004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby, 1995. "Social Construction of Trust to Protect Ideas and Data in Space Science and Geophysics," NBER Working Papers 5373, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby, 1996. "Costly Information in Firm Transformation, Exit, or Persistent Failure," NBER Working Papers 5577, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Pamela Tolbert & Lynne Zucker, 1994. "Institutional Analyses of Organizations: Legitimate but not Institutionalized," Institute for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series issr-1004, Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Norio Sawabe & Susumu Egashira, 2007. "The knowledge management strategy and the formation of innovative networks in emerging industries," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 277-298, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Julia Porter Liebeskind & Amalya Lumerman Oliver & Lynne G. Zucker & Marilynn B. Brewer, 1995. "Social Networks, Learning, and Flexibility: Sourcing Scientific Knowledge in New Biotechnology Firms," NBER Working Papers 5320, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Michael R. Darby & Lynne G. Zucker & Andrew Wang, 2003. "Universities, Joint Ventures, and Success in the Advanced Technology Program," NBER Working Papers 9463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes book chapters.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-20.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.