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Why Should Human Resource Managers Pay High Wages?

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Author Info
Lloyd Ulman (Univsersity of California, Berkeley)
Abstract

This essay is about human resource management, internal labor markets, and assorted theories of wage behavior. A stereotype of managerial activities and policies is sketched out in the first section, which, although reflecting a parochial (U.S.) orientation, is intended to approximate a set of real-world conditions to which analyses of labor market behavior should presumably relate. In the second section, we consider "institutionalist" interpretations, which either .supplement or challenge standard market analysis by appeal to the historical record, the behavioral sciences, or even the consensus of expert behavior. In particular, the importance of "conventional" forces, based heavily on perceptions of equity, interpersonal preferences, and custom and practice, is revealed by the scholarship and insights of Henry Phelps Brown. Next (section II) are assessed the claims and contributions of a sample of theories based on the assumption of individualistic utility maximization in competitive markets: the theories of equalizing wage differentials, human capital, deferred compensation, transaction costs, implicit contracts, and (least conventional) efficiency wages. None is found to be lacking in interpretive value or relevance to one or more attributes of the stereotype, and all help to relate it to a wider family of markets and to economic behavior. In general, however, this group is less satisfactory in explaining why wages should be high enoughin a present value sense and relative to market-clearing levelsto contribute to the relative insulation of internal labor markets and to restrict employment. An exception is provided by efficiency wage theory, in particular by one of its older variants which, because it is based on group (rather than individualistic) psychology and behavior, is discussed in the following section (V).

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Paper provided by Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley in its series Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series with number 1065.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 1992
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:indrel:1065

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Keywords: Ulman; human resource managers; wages; internal labor markets;

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  1. Pugel, Thomas A, 1980. "Profitability, Concentration and the Interindustry Variation in Wages," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 62(2), pages 248-53, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lazear, E.P., 1989. "Pensions And Deferred Benefits As Strategic Compensation," Papers e-89-9, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
  3. Akerlof, George A & Miyazaki, Hajime, 1980. "The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment Meets the Wage Bill Argument," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(2), pages 321-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John Pencavel, 1968. "An Analysis of the Quit Rate in American Manufacturing Industry," Working Papers 384, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
  5. Medoff, James L & Abraham, Katharine G, 1980. "Experience, Performance, and Earnings," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 95(4), pages 703-36, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. James E. Long & A. N. Link, 1983. "The impact of market structure on wages, fringe benefits, and turnover," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 36(2), pages 239-250, January.
  7. Krueger, Alan B & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-93, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Groshen, Erica L, 1991. "Sources of Intra-industry Wage Dispersion: How Much Do Employers Matter?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 869-84, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Brown, Charles, 1980. "Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(1), pages 113-34, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Parsons, Donald O, 1972. "Specific Human Capital: An Application to Quit Rates and Layoff Rates," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(6), pages 1120-43, Nov.-Dec.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 123-56, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Baily, Martin Neil, 1974. "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(1), pages 37-50, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Yellen, Janet L, 1984. "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 200-205, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Green, Jerry & Kahn, Charles M, 1983. "Wage-Employment Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 173-87, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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