Adverse Selection Without Hidden Information
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt62t1w8hf.
Date of creation: 02 Jun 1987
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adverse selection; hidden information; free rider problem; Social and Behavioral Sciences;
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- Jacques Crémer, 2010.
"Arm's-Length Relationships without Moral Hazard,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 377-387, 04-05.
- Svetlana Andrianova & Badi Baltagi & Panicos Demetriades & David Fielding, 2010.
"The African Credit Trap,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
10/18, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Oct 2010.
- Christopher Armstrong & David Larcker & Che-Lin Su, 2007. "Stock Options and Chief Executive Compensation," Discussion Papers 1447, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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