Collusion Through Insurance: Sharing the Costs of Oil Spill Cleanups
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt4xg216cg.
Date of creation: 01 May 1989
Date of revision:
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tacit coordination; collusion; oil spill; insurance; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Economic Policy; Environmental Policy; Science and Technology Policy;
Other versions of this item:
- Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1990. "Collusion through Insurance: Sharing the Cost of Oil Spill Cleanups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 249-52, March.
- Eddie Dekel and Suzanne Scotchmer., 1989. "Collusion Through Insurance: Sharing the Costs of Oil Spill Cleanups," Economics Working Papers 89-111, University of California at Berkeley.
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