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Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable

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Author Info
Federico Echenique (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, and Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la Republica)
Aaron Edlin (School of Law and Economics Dept., University of California, Berkeley)

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Abstract

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number 1037.

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Date of creation: 01 May 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:1037

Note: oai:cdlib1:iber/econ-1037
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Related research
Keywords: mixed-strategy equilibrium; learning; supermodular games; strategic complementarities; equilibrium selection; economics;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Federico Echenique, 2000. "Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complementarities," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1400, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Benaim, Michel & Hirsch, Morris W., 1999. "Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 36-72, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401.
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  5. Jeffery C. Ely & William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Evolution with Diverse Preferences," Discussion Papers 1317, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games," ESE Discussion Papers 53, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2000. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-115, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rabah Amir & Filomena Garcia & Malgorzata Knauff, 2006. "Endogenous Heterogeneity in Strategic Models: Symmetry-breaking via Strategic Substitutes and Nonconcavities," Working Papers 2006/29, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Echenique, Federico, 2002. "Finding All Equilibria," Working Papers 1153, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  3. AMIR, Rabah, 2003. "Supermodularity and complementarity in ecnomics: an elementary survey," CORE Discussion Papers 2003104, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games," ESE Discussion Papers 53, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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