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An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft

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Author Info
Richard Gilbert (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley)
Michael Katz (Haas School of Business, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley)

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Abstract

The Microsoft antitrust case focused public attention on the role of antitrust enforcement in preserving the forces of innovation in high-technology markets. Traditionally, regulators focused on whether companies artificially hiked prices or reduced output. Now, they're increasingly likely to look first at whether corporate behavior aids or impedes innovation.In this paper, we examine whether innovation has displaced short-term price effects as the focus of antitrust enforcement by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and, to the extent that it has, whether enforcement actions are any different as a result. We also ask whether enforcement actions in the area of intellectual property and innovation have been consistent with the 1995 DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property [IP Guidelines]. Finally, we consider whether recent enforcement actions identify key areas in which additional guidance from the Agencies would be desirable. We address these questions first in merger cases and then in non-merger cases.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number 1013.

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Date of creation: 01 May 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:1013

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Related research
Keywords: Microsoft; antitrust policy; monopolization; predation; network; L12; L41; K21 ;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Richard Gilbert, 2000. "Exclusive Dealing, Preferential Dealing, and Dynamic Efficiency," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 167-184, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
  3. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," NBER Working Papers 6831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1985. "On the Licensing of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 504-520, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Zvi Griliches, 1992. "The Search for R&D Spillovers," NBER Working Papers 3768, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, 1998. "Measuring The Social Return To R&D," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(4), pages 1119-1135, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1987. "Cost-Raising Strategies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 19-34, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1989. "The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 849-908 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-59, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2006. "Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets," NBER Working Papers 12604, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Hal R. Varian, 2001. "High-technology industries and market structure," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 65-101. [Downloadable!]
  4. Markus Pasche, 2005. "(Self-)Regulation of a Natural Monopoly via Complementary Goods - the Case of F/OSS Business Models," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 18/2005, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ilya Segal & Michael Whinston, 2005. "Antitrust in Innovative Industries," NBER Working Papers 11525, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Erwin Blackstone & John Roccili & Joseph Fuhr, 2002. "Winners, Losers, and Microsoft: Competition and Antitrust in High Technology Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, 1999, pp. 288," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(4), pages 433-441, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Markus Pasche & Sebastian von Engelhardt, 2004. "Volkswirtschaftliche Aspekte der Open-Source-Softwareentwicklung," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 18/2004, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  8. Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2008. "Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200807, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. repec:bep:rlecon:2:2007:1:1 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Stephane Verani, 2006. "Open Source Development in a Differentiated Duopoly," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 06-05, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2005. "Tying, Upgrades, and Switching Costs in Durable-Goods Markets," NBER Working Papers 11407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Christian Genthon, 2007. "Can we measure Microsoft's market power ?," Post-Print halshs-00153837_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  13. Robert E. Litan & Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Antitrust Policy During the Clinton Administration," Law and Economics 0303003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  14. Marc-Peter Radke, 2001. "Law and Economics of Microsoft vs. U.S. Department of Justice - New Paradigm for Antitrust in Network Markets or Inefficient Lock-In of Antitrust Policy?," Violette Reihe Arbeitspapiere 16-2001, Promotionsschwerpunkt Globalisierung und Beschaeftigung, revised Jun 2001. [Downloadable!]
  15. Steven J. Davis & Jack MacCrisken & Kevin M. Murphy, 2001. "Economic Perspectives on Software Design: PC Operating Systems and Platforms," NBER Working Papers 8411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. James E. Prieger & Wei-Min Hu, 2006. "An Empirical Analysis of Indirect Network Effects in the Home Video Game Market," Working Papers 06-25, NET Institute, revised Oct 2006. [Downloadable!]
  17. Pollock, Rufus, 2005. "The Control of Porting in Two-Sided Markets," MPRA Paper 5023, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2005. "Are Intellectual Property Rights Detrimental to Innovation?," Staff General Research Papers 12267, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2003. "Following the Follower in the Innovation Game," IDEI Working Papers 216, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  20. Oliver Budzinski, 2008. "A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200803, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
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