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The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties

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Author Info
Suzanne Scotchmer (Department of Economics and Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley; and NBER)
Abstract

Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protections. I characterize the circumstances in which countries would want to treat foreign inventors the same as national inventors. I then argue that national treatment of foreign inventors leads to stronger intellectual property protection than is optimal, and that this effect is exacerbated when protections must be harmonized. However levels of public and private R&D spending will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated externalities that its R&D spending confers on other countries. The stronger protection engendered by attempts at harmonization are a partial remedy.

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File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=iber/econ
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number 1008.

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Date of creation: 03 Aug 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:1008

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Related research
Keywords: Intellectual Property Globalization TRIPS treaty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1247-80, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Deardorff, Alan V, 1992. "Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(233), pages 35-51, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Anne O. Krueger, 2000. "NAFTA's Effects: A Preliminary Assessment," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(6), pages 761-775, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
  6. Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer., 2001. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Economics Working Papers E01-303, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Chin, J.C. & Grossman, G.M., 1988. "Intellectual Property Rigths And North-South Trade," Papers 143, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Grossman, Gene & Lai, Edwin, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," CEPR Discussion Papers 3118, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Josh Lerner, 2002. "Patent Protection and Innovation Over 150 Years," NBER Working Papers 8977, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C.Lai, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," Governance Working Papers 188, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Suzanne Scotchmer, 2003. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1084, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
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