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Judicialization and the Construction of Governance

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  • Stone Sweet, Alex
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    Abstract

    I present a model of the emergence and evolution of governance, conceived (narrowly) as the continuous resolution of dyadic conflicts by a third party. The model is comprised of three core elements: normative structure, dyadic contracting, and triadic dispute resolution. I demonstrate that a move to triadic dispute resolution leads the triadic dispute resolver to construct, and then to manage, specific causal relationships between exchange, conflict, and rules. Once established, triadic governance perpetuates a discourse about the rulefulness of individual behavior, and this discourse gradually penetrates and is absorbed into those repertoires of reasoning and action that constitute political agency. In this way, political life is judicialized. The model further predicts that, under certain specified conditions, the triad will constitute a crucial mechanism of (micro and macro) political change. I then illustrate the power of the model to explain judicialization and the dynamics of change in two very different political systems: the international trade regime and the French Fifth Republic. In the conclusion, I draw out the implications of the analysis for our understanding of the complex relationship between strategic behavior and social structure.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Center for Culture, Organizations and Politics of theInstitute for Research on Labor and Employment, UC Berkeley in its series Center for Culture, Organizations and Politics, Working Paper Series with number qt2fc6571w.

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    Date of creation: 03 Jan 1999
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    Handle: RePEc:cdl:cuorpo:qt2fc6571w

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    1. Wendt, Alexander, 1992. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(02), pages 391-425, March.
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    Cited by:
    1. Andreas Grimmel, 2011. "Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor," Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po 3, Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris.
    2. Grimmel, Andreas, 2011. "Politics in robes? The European Court of Justice and the myth of judicial activism," Discussion Papers 2/11, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European Integration.

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