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The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties

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Author Info
Suzanne Scotchmer (Department of Economics and Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley; and NBER)

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Abstract

Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protections. I characterize the circumstances in which countries would want to treat foreign inventors the same as national inventors. I then argue that national treatment of foreign inventors leads to stronger intellectual property protection than is optimal, and that this effect is exacerbated when protections must be harmonized. However levels of public and private R&D spending will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated externalities that its R&D spending confers on other countries. The stronger protection engendered by attempts at harmonization are a partial remedy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series with number CPC01-24.

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Date of creation: 02 Aug 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:compol:cpc01-24

Note: oai:cdlib1:iber/cpc-1002
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Keywords: intellectual property globalization TRIPS treaty

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  1. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Spencer, Barbara J & Brander, James A, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 707-22, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Moschini, Giancarlo, 2003. "Intellectual Property Rights and the World Trade Organization: Retrospect and Prospects," Staff General Research Papers 10442, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Grossman, Gene & Lai, Edwin, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," CEPR Discussion Papers 3118, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Sumner J La Croix & Denise Eby Konan, 2006. "Have Developing Countries Gained From the Marriage Between Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property Rights?," Working Papers 200605, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2003. "Rent Seeking and Innovation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000465, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Lewis Evans and Patrick Hughes, 2003. "Competition Policy in Small Distant Open Economies: Some Lessons from the Economics Literature," Treasury Working Paper Series 03/31, New Zealand Treasury. [Downloadable!]
  6. Josh Lerner, 2002. "Patent Protection and Innovation Over 150 Years," NBER Working Papers 8977, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C.Lai, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," Governance Working Papers 188, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 2004. "The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law: An Economic Approach," Economics Discussion Papers 581, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gene M Grossman & Edwin L Lai, 2004. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000442, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Suzanne Scotchmer, 2003. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1084, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Wilfred J. Ethier, 2003. "TRIPS, externalities, trade agreements, hostages," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-034, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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