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Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules

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Author Info
Maurice Obstfeld (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley)
Kenneth Rogoff (Department of Economics, Harvard University)

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Abstract

It is well known that if international linkages are relatively small, the potential gains to international monetary policy coordination are typically quite limited. But what if goods and financial markets are tightly linked? Is it then problematic if countries unilaterally design their institutions for monetary stabilization? Are the stabilization gains from having separate currencies largely squandered in the absence of effective international monetary coordination? We argue that under plausible assumptions the answer is no. Unless risk aversion is very high, lack of coordination in rule setting is a second-order problem compared to the overall gains from monetary policy stabilization.

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Paper provided by Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series with number 1001.

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Date of creation: 01 May 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ciders:1001

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Related research
Keywords: International policy coordination; international policy cooperation; monetary policy rules; policy precommitment;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti, 2001. "Welfare And Macroeconomic Interdependence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 421-445, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 1141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Cedric Tille, 2000. ""Beggar-thy-neighbor" or "beggar-thyself"? the income effect of exchange rate fluctuations," Staff Reports 112, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  4. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe & Ellen R. McGrattan, 1997. "Monetary Shocks and Real Exchange Rates in Sticky Price Models of International Business Cycles," NBER Working Papers 5876, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 199-217, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Hali J. Edison, 1990. "A new interpretation of the coordination problem and its empirical significance," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 399-435.
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  7. Jensen, Henrik, 2000. "Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 517-539, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Michael B. Devereux & Charles Engel, 2000. "Monetary Policy in the Open Economy Revisited: Price Setting and Exchange Rate Flexibility," Working Papers 042000, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Jordi Gali & Tommaso Monacelli, 1999. "Optimal Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 438, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 15 Nov 1999. [Downloadable!]
  10. Devereux, Michael B & Engel, Charles M, 2000. "Monetary Policy In The Open Economy Revisited: Price Setting Rules And Exchange Rate Flexibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 2454, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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