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Non-disclosure and Adverse Disclosure as Signals of Firm Value

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Author Info
Siew Teoh (Anderson School of Management)
Chuan Hwang (Katz Graduate School of Business)

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Abstract

We present a model in which some of the firm's information ("new") can be disclosed verifiably and some information ("type") cannot, to show that some firms may voluntarily withhold good news and disclose bad news. We describe an equilibrium in which high-type firms withhold good news and disclose bad news whereas low-type firms disclose good news and withhold bad news. Under some parameter values, this equilibrium exists when other more traditional equilibria are ruled out by standard equilibrium refinements. The model explains some otherwise anomalous empirical evidence concerning stock price reactions to disclosure, provides some new empirical predictions, and suggests that mandatory disclosure requirements may have the undesirable consequence of making it more difficult for firms to reveal information that cannot be disclosed credibly.

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File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1182&context=anderson/fin
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA in its series University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management with number 1182.

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Date of creation: 27 Nov 1990
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:anderf:1182

Note: oai:cdlib1:anderson/fin-1182
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
  2. Rotemberg, Julio J & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "Shareholder-Value Maximization and Product-Market Competition," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 367-91. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Darrough, Masako N. & Stoughton, Neal M., 1990. "Financial disclosure policy in an entry game," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1-3), pages 219-243, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Titman, Sheridan & Trueman, Brett, 1986. "Information quality and the valuation of new issues," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 159-172, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Miller, Merton H & Rock, Kevin, 1985. " Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1031-51, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Ritter, Jay R, 1983. "Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(2), pages 331-46, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Brennan, Michael J, 1990. " Latent Assets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 709-30, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Diamond, Douglas W, 1985. " Optimal Release of Information by Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1071-94, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Wagenhofer, Alfred, 1990. "Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 341-363, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Boyan Jovanovic, 1982. "Truthful Disclosure of Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 36-44, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Dybvig, Philip H & Zender, Jaime F, 1991. "Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 201-19. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Verrecchia, Robert E., 1983. "Discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 179-194, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Spiegel, Mark M. & Yamori, Nobuyoshi, 2004. "Determinants of Voluntary Bank Disclosure: Evidence from Japanese Shinkin Banks," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Estelle Gozlan & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2001. "A Theory of Environmental Risk Disclosure," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-17, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, . "Signaling and Countersignaling: A Theory of Understatement," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-21, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  4. David Hirshleifer & SONYA SEONGYEON LIM & Siew Hong Teoh, 2004. "Disclosure to an Audience with Limited Attention," Game Theory and Information 0412002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Kremer, Ilan, 2005. "Ratings, Certifications and Grades: Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown," Research Papers 1814r2, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Kim-Sau Chung & Peter Eso, 2007. "Signalling with Career Concerns," Discussion Papers 1443, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hirshleifer, David & Lim, Sonya S. & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2004. "Disclosure to a Credulous Audience: The Role of Limited Attention," MPRA Paper 5198, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. Acharya, Viral V & DeMarzo, Peter & Kremer, Ilan, 2008. "Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements," CEPR Discussion Papers 6985, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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