Avanidhar Subrahmanyam (Anderson School of Management)
Abstract
We present a dynamic model of production in which a firm's output increases when its managers share their information. Communication of ideas depends on the quality of the firm's internal language. We prove that firms with richer languages (i.e., more organizational capital) will have higher market values. Organizational capital generates static complementarities among incumbents which implies that firms with richer languages will experience greater employee retention and higher wages. Dynamic complementarities between intertemporal investments in language generate long-run persistence in firm market-to-book and turnover ratios. We demonstrate that the optimal compensation of incumbents includes an earnings-insensitive component that is larger in firms with richer languages. In a simple model of mergers, we show that the most value-creating mergers are those between firms with highly disparate languages.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Schwert, G. William, 2003.
"Anomalies and market efficiency,"
Handbook of the Economics of Finance,
in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 939-974
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: