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Dynamic intrahousehold bargaining, matrimonial property law and suicide in Canada

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  • Adam, Christopher
  • Hoddinott, John
  • Ligon, Ethan A.

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic model of household bargaining and uses it to motivate an empirical analysis of the impact changes in Canadian laws regarding the allocation of family assets upon divorce on female suicide. Using time series data, we show that in Ontario, the passage of Canadian legislation that improved women's rights to assets upon divorce was associated with reductions in the rate of female suicide amongst older (married) women while not affecting younger (unmarried) women. As suggested by our model, its impact was asymmetric in that male suicide rates were unaffected by this change. We also exploited a quasi-natural experiment in these data, namely that no comparable legislative change occurred in Quebec. Here, we do not observe a structural break in the data.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series with number qt4dm5w8v1.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2011
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt4dm5w8v1

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Keywords: intrahousehold; bargaining; divorce; suicide; Canada; Agricultural and Resource Economics; Social Sciences;

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References

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  1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  3. Marjorie B. McElroy, 1990. "The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 559-583.
  4. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1.
  5. Alderman, Harold, et al, 1995. "Unitary versus Collective Models of the Household: Is It Time to Shift the Burden of Proof?," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, February.
  6. Kletzer, Kenneth M. & Wright, Brian D., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt4qg3c42v, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  7. Donald W.K. Andrews, 1990. "Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change with Unknown Change Point," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 943, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Ligon, Ethan & Thomas, Jonathan P & Worrall, Tim, 2002. "Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 209-44, January.
  9. Narayana Kocherlakota, 2010. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing Without Commitment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2053, David K. Levine.
  10. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-37, May.
  11. Browning, M. & Bourguignon, F. & Chiappori, P.A. & Lechene, V., 1992. "Incomes and Outcomes: A structural Model of Intra-Household Allocation," DELTA Working Papers 92-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  12. Hamermesh, Daniel S & Soss, Neal M, 1974. "An Economic Theory of Suicide," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 83-98, Jan.-Feb..
  13. Bean, C R & Layard, P R G & Nickell, S J, 1986. "The Rise in Unemployment: A Multi-country Study," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 53(210(S)), pages S1-22, Supplemen.
  14. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
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Cited by:
  1. Ngo, Thi Minh-Phuong & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2008. "Microfinance and Gender Empowerment," MPRA Paper 11293, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Steven Stern & Leora Friedberg, 2010. "Marriage, Divorce, and Asymmetric Information," Virginia Economics Online Papers 385, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  3. Alessandra Voena, 2011. "Yours, Mine and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertemporal Behavior of Married Couples?," Discussion Papers 10-022, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

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