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When Promoters Like Scalpers

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Author Info
Larry Karp (University of California, Berkeley and Giannini Foundation)
Jeffrey Perloff (University of California, Berkeley, and Giannini Foundation)

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Abstract

If a monopoly supplies a perishable good, such as tickets to a performance, and is unable to price discriminate within a period, the monopoly may benefit from the potential entry of resellers. If the monopoly attempts to intertemporally price discriminate, the equilibrium in the game among buyers is indeterminate when the resellers are not allowed to enter, and the monopoly's problem is not well defined. An arbitrarily small amount of heterogeneity of information among the buyers leads to a unique equilibrium. We show how the potential entry of resellers alters this equilibrium.

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File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=are_ucb
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Paper provided by Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series with number 916R.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:916r

Note: oai:cdlib1:are_ucb-1046
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Related research
Keywords: intertemporal price discrimination scalpers coordination game common knowledge

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Van Cayseele, Patrick, 1991. "Consumer rationing and the posssibility of intertemporal price discrimination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 1473-1484, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rosen, Sherwin & Rosenfield, Andrew M, 1997. "Ticket Pricing," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 351-76, October.
    Other versions:
  3. repec:att:wimass:19905 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Barro, Robert J & Romer, Paul M, 1987. "Ski-Lift Pricing, with Applications to Labor and Other," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 875-90, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dudey, Marc, 1996. "Dynamic Monopoly with Nondurable Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 470-488, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bertonazzi, Eric P & Maloney, Michael T & McCormick, Robert E, 1993. "Some Evidence on the Alchian and Allen Theorem: The Third Law of Demand?," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(3), pages 383-93, July.
  8. Gale, Ian L & Holmes, Thomas J, 1993. "Advance-Purchase Discounts and Monopoly Allocation of Capacity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 135-46, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Peck, James, 1996. "Demand Uncertainty, Incomplete Markets, and the Optimality of Rationing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 342-363, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Chiang, Raymond & Spatt, Chester S, 1982. "Imperfect Price Discrimination and Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(2), pages 155-81, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Patrick DeGraba & Rafi Mohammed, 1999. "Intertemporal Mixed Bundling and Buying Frenzies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(4), pages 694-718, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Lott, John R, Jr & Roberts, Russell D, 1991. "A Guide to the Pitfalls of Identifying Price Discrimination," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 14-23, January.
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