Gérard CHAMBAS () (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International) Jean-Louis COMBES () (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International) Gbewopo ATTILA () (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International)
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In this paper, we analyze the relationship between corruption and public revenues. An empirical investigation of panel data (125 countries and covering the period 1980-2002) makes it possible not to reject the hypothesis that corruption has a negative effect on public revenues collection. However, the impact is different on the various components of revenue. This is because different rent opportunities are created by corruption which seems to modify public revenues structure in favour of customs tariffs revenues while reducing direct and indirect taxes such as VAT. It also appears that a major channel of corruption is the weakening of the tax morality which in this study is captured by various public service delivery variables.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CERDI in its series Working Papers with number
200716.
Length: 38 Date of creation: 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:912
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