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Dépenses publiques d’éducation et instabilité politique : une application à la zone franc par un modèle d’Equilibre Général Calculable

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  • Frédéric PUECH

    ()
    (Consultant indépendant)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to test for franc zone the hypothesis that public expenditures in education can act negatively on political instability, and by way, can be positively correlated with economic growth, even on the short run. To do so, a rebellion model is estimated econometrically and introduced in a computable general equilibrium model (CGE) calibrated for franc zone.

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File URL: http://publi.cerdi.org/ed/2002/2002.19.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CERDI in its series Working Papers with number 200219.

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Length: 14
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:184

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Keywords: CGE models; public expenditures in education; Political instability;

References

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  1. Barro, Robert J, 1990. "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S103-26, October.
  2. Cothren, Richard, 2002. " A Model of Military Spending and Economic Growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(1-2), pages 121-41, January.
  3. Rodrik, Dani & Alesina, Alberto, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," Scholarly Articles 4551798, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Anderson, Kym, 1993. "Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 789, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Azam, Jean-Paul, 1995. " How to Pay for the Peace? A Theoretical Framework with References to African Countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 173-84, April.
  6. Patrick GUILLAUMONT & Sylviane GUILLAUMONT JEANNENEY & Jean-François BRUN, 1997. "How Instability Lowers African Growth ?," Working Papers 199712, CERDI.
  7. Barro, R.J., 1989. "Economic Growth In A Cross Section Of Countries," RCER Working Papers 201, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  8. Jean-Paul AZAM & Jean-Claude BERTHELEMY & Stéphane CALIPEL, 1996. "Risque politique et croissance en Afrique," Working Papers 199624, CERDI.
  9. Fosu, Augustin Kwasi, 1992. "Political Instability and Economic Growth: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(4), pages 829-41, July.
  10. Fosu, A. K., 2001. "Political instability and economic growth in developing economies: some specification empirics," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 289-294, February.
  11. Decaluwe, B. & Patry, A. & Savard, L. & Thorbecke, E., 1999. "Poverty Analysis Within a General Equilibrium Framework," Cahiers de recherche 9909, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
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