An analysis of duration dependence of government revenue expansions and contractions in Developing Countries
AbstractIn this paper, we employ the discrete-time duration model to examine whether expansion and contraction phases of government revenue exhibit duration dependence. We hence use an unbalanced panel data of public revenue on 68 developing countries over the period 1980-2009. The analysis also covers the sub-samples of sub-Saharan African and Non sub-Saharan African countries. Our findings suggest that once controlling for frailty and economic variables, the likelihood of public revenue expansion and contraction ending appears to be positively affected by their actual age: government revenue expansion and contraction exhibit in developing countries positive duration dependence.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CERDI in its series Working Papers with number 201229.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Government Revenue; Discrete-time model; Duration dependence;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
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