Corruption as a form of extreme individualism: An economic explanation based on geography and climate conditions
AbstractWe present a simple model explaining corruption on geography and climate conditions. We test the model's validity in a cross-section of 115 countries. Controlling for all other corruption's determinants we find evidence supporting the model's predictions. Corruption increases with temperature and declines with precipitation and non-cultivatable land. Corruption also declines with per capita GDP, democracy, median age and British colonial heritage; and increases with natural resources, bureaucracy and communist past. Finally, corruption declines with the ratio of internet users to total population. This new finding is interpreted as capturing the beneficial interaction of economic development, human capital/education and independent news.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section in its series Cardiff Economics Working Papers with number E2010/8.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
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individualism; fairness; corruption; geography and climate conditions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2010-10-02 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-10-02 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- Carolina Achury & Christos Koulovatianos & John Tsoukalas, .
"External Sovereign Debt in a Monetary Union: Bailouts and the Role of Corruption,"
11/11, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).
- Carolina Achury & Christos Koulovatianos & John D. Tsoukalas, 2011. "External Sovereign Debt in a Monetary Union: Bailouts and the Role of Corruption," CESifo Working Paper Series 3532, CESifo Group Munich.
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