Are Central Bank Preferences Asymmetric? A Comment
AbstractA recent paper by Ruge-Murcia [European Economic Review 48 (2004), 91-107] on asymmetric central bank objectives provides a new perspective on the policy roots of inflation in developed economies. More precisely, the paper demonstrates that if the distribution of the supply shocks is normal, then the reduced form solution for inflation implies a positive (or negative) relation between average inflation and the variance of shocks. We argue that the evidence offered in support of this hypothesis suffers from lack of identification because Phillips curve nonlinearity combined with quadratic central bank preferences yield the same reduced form solution for inflation. If so, estimating reduced form for inflation will not be able to discriminate between these models. Yet they have quite different implications for policy. Other, structural, evidence is needed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section in its series Cardiff Economics Working Papers with number E2008/5.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economic Notes , Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 37(1) (2008), 119-126
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More information through EDIRC
Preference asymmetry; Phillips curve nonlinearity; Identification;
Other versions of this item:
- Patrick Minford & Naveen Srinivasan, 2008. "Are Central Bank Preferences Asymmetric? A Comment," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 37(1), pages 119-126, 02.
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2008-02-23 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2008-02-23 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2008-02-23 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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