Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information
AbstractWithin an incomplete information framework (where the primitives are the individuals'' belief hierarchies) we investigate the intersubjective implications of the assumption that it is common belief that no individual has any false beliefs (a key component of the Truth Axiom). We consider two types of intersubjective conditions: (1) qualitative agreement and unbounded gains from betting, and (2) a notion of intersubjective caution. The entire analysis is carried out locally.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California, Davis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 973.
Date of creation: 08 Jan 2003
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Other versions of this item:
- Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 3-29, July.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, . "Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information," Department of Economics 97-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
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- Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
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- Giacomo Bonanno, 2003.
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- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, . "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Department of Economics 98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
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