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Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information

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  • Klaus Nehring
  • Giacomo Bonanno

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

Within an incomplete information framework (where the primitives are the individuals'' belief hierarchies) we investigate the intersubjective implications of the assumption that it is common belief that no individual has any false beliefs (a key component of the Truth Axiom). We consider two types of intersubjective conditions: (1) qualitative agreement and unbounded gains from betting, and (2) a notion of intersubjective caution. The entire analysis is carried out locally.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of California, Davis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 973.

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Date of creation: 08 Jan 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:97-3

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Cited by:
  1. Jean-Marc Tallon & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Shmuel Zamir, 2003. "Contradicting Beliefs and Communication," Discussion Paper Series dp311, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  2. Samet, Dov, 2013. "Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 192-200.
  3. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, . "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Department of Economics 98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
  4. Giacomo Bonanno, 2014. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 149, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  5. Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-36, January.
  6. Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents," Economics Working Papers 0035, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  7. Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Generalisation of Samet's (2010) agreement theorem," MPRA Paper 29067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Michael Trost, 2013. "Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 755-776, August.
  9. Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Agreeing to disagree with generalised decision functions," MPRA Paper 29066, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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