Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information
AbstractWithin an incomplete information framework (where the primitives are the individuals'' belief hierarchies) we investigate the intersubjective implications of the assumption that it is common belief that no individual has any false beliefs (a key component of the Truth Axiom). We consider two types of intersubjective conditions: (1) qualitative agreement and unbounded gains from betting, and (2) a notion of intersubjective caution. The entire analysis is carried out locally.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California, Davis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 973.
Date of creation: 08 Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 3-29, July.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, . "Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information," Department of Economics 97-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents," Economics Working Papers 0035, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, .
"Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief,"
Department of Economics
98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2003. "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Working Papers 983, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2011.
"Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games,"
1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Bonanno, Giacomo, 2011. "Reasoning about Strategies and Rational Play in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 11-11, University of California at Davis, Department of Economics.
- Jean-Marc Tallon & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Shmuel Zamir, 2003. "Contradicting Beliefs and Communication," Discussion Paper Series dp311, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-36, January.
- Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Generalisation of Samet's (2010) agreement theorem," MPRA Paper 29067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Agreeing to disagree with generalised decision functions," MPRA Paper 29066, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Scott Dyer).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.