Intersubjective Consistency Of Beliefs And The Logic Of Common Belief
AbstractWe characterize the class of n-person belief systems for which common belief has the properties of the strongest logic of belief, KD45. The characterizing condition states that individuals are not too mistaken in their beliefs about common beliefs. It is shown to be considerably weaker than the consistency condition on interpersonal beliefs implied by the common knowledge assumption: it allows individuals to ""agree to disagree"" and to be quite incorrect about others7 beliefs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California, Davis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 958.
Date of creation: 13 Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Bonanno, G. & Nehring, K., 1995. "Intersubjective Consistency of Beliefs and the Logic of Common Belief," Papers 95-08, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
- Bonanno, G. & Nehring, K., 1995. "Intersubjective Consistency of Beliefs and the Logic of Common Belief," Department of Economics 95-08, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
- D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other
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