The Logic Of Belief Persistency
AbstractThe interaction bietween knowledge and belief in a temporal context is analyzed. An axiomatic formulation and semantic characterization of the principle of belief persistency implied by the standard conditionalization rule are provided. This principle says that an individual does not change her mind unless new evidence forces her to do so. It is shown that if beliefs are conscious (or stateindependent) and satisfy negative introspection then the principle of persistency of beliefs is characterized by the following axiom schema: the individual believes that 9 at date t if and orilly if she believes at date t that she will believe that 4 at date t+l.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California, Davis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 9518.
Date of creation: 13 Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2005.
"A simple modal logic for belief revision,"
517, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, .
"The Logic Of Prediction,"
Department of Economics
98-12, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999.
"Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory,"
Research in Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
- Pierpaolo Battigali & Giacomo Bonanno, . "Recent Results On Belief, Knowledge And The Epistemic Foundations Of Game Theory," Department of Economics 98-14, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2003. "Recent Results On Belief, Knowledge And The Epistemic Foundations Of Game Theory," Working Papers 9814, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Matthew Ryan, 2001. "Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 73-87, August.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2003.
"Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief,"
983, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, . "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Department of Economics 98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Hans Hvide, 1999.
"Bounds to Memory Loss,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-21, February.
- Dov Samet, 1999.
"Bayesianism without Learning,"
Game Theory and Information
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Scott Dyer).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.