How mindless is standard economics really?
AbstractContrary to claims by Gul and Pesendorfer (2008), I show that standard economics makes use of non-choice evidence in a meaningful way. This is because standard economics solely grounded in the theory of choice is ""incomplete"". That is, it has content that cannot be revealed with any general choice procedure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California, Davis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 917.
Date of creation: 22 Oct 2009
Date of revision:
revealed preference; theory of choice; neuroeconomics; non-choice evidence; machines;
Other versions of this item:
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
- C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D87 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Neuroeconomics
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- Caplin, Andrew & Schotter, Andrew, 2008. "The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195328318.
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