Efficient Risk Sharing in the Presence of a Public Good
AbstractThis paper studies the provision of a public good between two agents under lack of commitment and applies it to the problem of children's consumption in separated couples, where children are considered to be public goods. The custodial mother controls the child's consumption, whereas the father can contribute indirectly by making monetary transfers to the mother, but has no control over how the mother spends them. Using minmax punishments, I look for the Pareto frontier of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium payoffs, and characterize the equilibrium and long term implications of the model. As in the previous literature, agents' consumptions and continuation values covary positively with their income levels. In the case where the constraint for the public good provision binds, both agents' private consumptions increase relative to the public good provision. In the long run, if some first best allocation is sustainable, the long-term equilibrium will converge to a first best allocation. Otherwise, agents' utilities oscillate over a finite set of values. I then study the theoretical implications of one-sided enforcement when the public good provider has the authority to enforce transfers from the second agent. This is motivated by the wave of US policy reforms to enforce child support payments from fathers. The model predicts an increase in the ratio of the mother's consumption to the child's.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 87.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
insurance; lack of commitment; optimal dynamic contract; public good;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - General
- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-02-14 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2009-02-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IAS-2009-02-14 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2009-02-14 (Public Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Giovanni Bert).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.