Brothers in alms? coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations
AbstractMission-driven nonprofi?t organizations compete for donations through fundrais- ing activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonpro?fits impose ex- ternalities on each others? output. This paper studies the design of sustainable voluntary cooperation agreements, using a game-theoretic model of alliance formation. Two key char- acteristics determine the stability of cooperation: the alliance formation rule and whether the fundraising efforts of nonprofi?ts are strategic complements or substitutes. Both affect the incentives to deviate from the cooperative agreement (by one or several nonpro?ts). We propose conditions on the alliance formation protocols that facilitate the stability of Pareto-optimal cooperation in fundraising.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 293.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
nonprofits; giving; coordination; endogenous coalition formation; non-distribution constraint.;
Other versions of this item:
- Gani Aldashev & Marco A. Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2014. "Brothers in alms ? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations," DIAG Technical Reports 2014-02, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
- Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2014. "Brothers in Alms? Coordination Betwen Nonprofits on Markets for Donations," Working Papers 1406, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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