Brothers in alms? coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations
AbstractMission-driven nonprofi?t organizations compete for donations through fundrais- ing activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonpro?fits impose ex- ternalities on each others? output. This paper studies the design of sustainable voluntary cooperation agreements, using a game-theoretic model of alliance formation. Two key char- acteristics determine the stability of cooperation: the alliance formation rule and whether the fundraising efforts of nonprofi?ts are strategic complements or substitutes. Both affect the incentives to deviate from the cooperative agreement (by one or several nonpro?ts). We propose conditions on the alliance formation protocols that facilitate the stability of Pareto-optimal cooperation in fundraising.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 293.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
nonprofits; giving; coordination; endogenous coalition formation; non-distribution constraint.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Giovanni Bert).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.