Price as a signal of product quality: some experimental evidence
AbstractWe separate the budgetary and non-budgetary effects of price on demand using choice data from wine tasting experiments in which consumers tasted wines of different quality accompanied by fictitious price information. The non-budgetary effect is present and nonlinear: it is strongly positive between €3 and €5, and undetectable between €5 and €8. We find a similar nonlinear price-quality relationship in a large sample of wine ratings from the same price segment, supporting the hypothesis that consumer behavior in the experiment is consistent with rationally using prices as signals of quality. Price signals also have greater importance for inexperienced (young) consumers.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 268.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision: 2013
Pricing; signaling; product quality; wine ratings;
Other versions of this item:
- Giovanni Mastrobuoni & Franco Peracchi & Aleksey Tetenov, 2012. "Price as a signal of product quality: Some experimental evidence," EIEF Working Papers Series 1214, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Oct 2012.
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-10-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2012-10-27 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-IND-2012-10-27 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ippolito, Pauline M & Mathios, Alan D, 1995. "Information and Advertising: The Case of Fat Consumption in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 91-95, May.
- Héla Hadj Ali & Céline Nauges, 2007. "The Pricing of Experience Goods: The Example of en primeur Wine," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(1), pages 91-103.
- Philippe Mahenc, 2004. "Influence of Informed Buyers in Markets Susceptible to the Lemons Problem," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(3), pages 649-659.
- Gerard J. Tellis & Birger Wernerfelt, 1987. "Competitive Price and Quality Under Asymmetric Information," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 6(3), pages 240-253.
- Min Ding & Rajdeep Grewal & John Liechty, 2005. "Incentive-aligned conjoint analysis," Framed Field Experiments 00139, The Field Experiments Website.
- Héla Hadj Ali & Sébastien Lecocq & Michael Visser, 2005.
"The impact of gurus : Parker grades and en primeur wine prices,"
Research Unit Working Papers
0507, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
- HélaHadj Ali & Sébastien Lecocq & Michael Visser, 2008. "The Impact of Gurus: Parker Grades and "En Primeur" Wine Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(529), pages F158-F173, 06.
- Ali, Hela Hadj & Lecocq, Sebastien & Visser, Michael, 2007. "The Impact of Gurus: Parker Grades and EN PRIMEUR Wine Prices," Working Papers 37292, American Association of Wine Economists.
- Hadj Ali H. & Lecocq S. & Visser M., 2007. "The impact of gurus: Parker grades and en primeur wine prices¤," Working Papers ERMES 0718, ERMES, University Paris 2.
- Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, 1990. "Information, Advertising and Health Choices: A Study of the Cereal Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 459-480, Autumn.
- Wolinsky, Asher, 1983. "Prices as Signals of Product Quality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 647-58, October.
- Heffetz, Ori & Shayo, Moses, 2009.
"How Large Are Non-Budget-Constraint Effects Of Prices On Demand?,"
53882, American Association of Wine Economists.
- Ori Heffetz & Moses Shayo, 2009. "How Large Are Non-Budget-Constraint Effects of Prices on Demand?," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(4), pages 170-99, October.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986.
"Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
- Orley Ashenfelter, 2008.
"Predicting the Quality and Prices of Bordeaux Wine,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(529), pages F174-F184, 06.
- Ashenfelter, Orley, 2007. "Predicting the quality and prices of Bordeaux wines," Working Papers 37297, American Association of Wine Economists.
- Spence, Michael, 1976. "Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 591-97, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Giovanni Bert).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.