Frictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admission
AbstractWe measure friction in the matching of students and law schools as the number of unnecessary student applications and school admissions that have to be undertaken per actual matriculation. We show that friction increases with student and school attractiveness, but decreases for top schools and students. We discuss connections with the literature on frictional matching.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 113.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
college admission; frictional matching; assortative matching; student portfolio; school standard;
Other versions of this item:
- Courty, Pascal & Pagliero, Mario, 2010. "Frictional matching: Evidence from law school admission," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 208-211, August.
- Pascal Courty & Mario Pagliero, 2009. "Frictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admission," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/25, European University Institute.
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2009-07-17 (Education)
- NEP-GTH-2009-07-17 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2009-07-17 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1997. "Assortative Matching and Search," Working papers 97-2a, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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