Shocks and Relationships
AbstractIn this paper we experimentally study effects of exogenous revenue shocks on long-term relationships between firms and workers. While we find that shocks have no significant effect on wages and a little effect on the duration of relationships, we observe their significant effect on effort levels: given the same wage, the workers exert lower effort in the condition with shocks than in the condition with no shocks. As a result, the presence of shocks in our experiment decreases market efficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 09/07.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 27 Apr 2009
Date of revision:
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Experiment; exogenous revenue shocks; gift exchange;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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