We analyze the success of filtering as a solution to the spam problem when used alone or concurrently with sender and/or receiver pricing. We find that filters alone may exacerbate the spam problem if the spammer attempts to evade them by sending multiple variants of the message to each consumer. Sender and receiver prices can effectively reduce or eliminating spam, either on their own or when used together with filtering. Finally, we discuss the impli- cations for social welfare of using the different spam controls.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Canterbury, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number
08/21.
B. Curtis Eaton & Ian MacDonald & Laura Meriluoto, 2008.
"Spam - solutions and their problems,"
Working Papers
2008-09, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 07 Feb 2008.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
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