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Theorizing Corporate Governance: New Organizational Alternatives

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Author Info
Simon Learmount
Abstract

This paper contrasts 'economic' and 'organizational' approaches to corporate governance, in order to draw out some of their distinctive features and discuss their relative strengths and weaknesses. Some promising areas of new research are identified which examine the role of social controls and trust for the way that companies are governed. Although these are fairly embryonic, it is argued that they call into question the hegemony of economic theories in theorizing the governance of the corporation. The paper concludes by advocating a re-consideration and broadening of the current conceptual scope of corporate governance, so as to facilitate and encourage other potentially valuable ways of exploring and understanding how companies are governed.

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Paper provided by ESRC Centre for Business Research in its series ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers with number wp237.

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Date of creation: Jun 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp237

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Related research
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Social Controls;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
B20 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - General

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  7. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 351-66, September.
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