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Assessing the Design of the Low-Income Subsidy Program in Medicare Part D: Working Paper 2014-07

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  • Andrew Stocking
  • James Baumgardner
  • Melinda Buntin
  • Anna Cook

Abstract

By Andrew Stocking (CBO), James Baumgardner (CBO), Melinda Buntin (Vanderbilt University), and Anna Cook (CBO) The structure of the Medicare Part D prescription drug program generally encourages plan sponsors to submit low bids. However, rules in the program relating to low-income beneficiaries generate a different set of incentives for plans seeking to serve those beneficiaries. We find that over the first five years of the Part D program, two types of plans emerged—those that catered primarily to beneficiaries receiving low-

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Stocking & James Baumgardner & Melinda Buntin & Anna Cook, 2014. "Assessing the Design of the Low-Income Subsidy Program in Medicare Part D: Working Paper 2014-07," Working Papers 49451, Congressional Budget Office.
    • Handle: RePEc:cbo:wpaper:49451
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:mpr:mprres:7375 is not listed on IDEAS
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    1. Andrew Stocking & James Baumgardner & Melinda Buntin & Anna Cook, 2014. "Examining the Number of Competitors and the Cost of Medicare Part D: Working Paper 2014-04," Working Papers 45553, Congressional Budget Office.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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