This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Inter-State Spillovers and Lobbying

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Evgeny Yakovlev () (UC Berkeley)
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya () (New Economic School, CEFIR, and CEPR)
Sergei Guriev () (New Economic School)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996-2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cas.hse.ru/Repec/pdf/WP13_2007_16.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Vadim Khramov)
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis in its series Working Papers with number WP13_2007_16.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cas:wpaper:wp13_2007_16

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Pokrovsky blvd, 11, Moscow
Web page: http://www.macro.hse.ru
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Vadim Khramov).

Related research
Keywords: interest groups; lobbying; inter-regional trade barriers; tariffs; multinationals; federalism;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Daniel Berkowitz & David DeJong, 1998. "Russia's Internal Border," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 189, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Sandra Poncet, 2004. "A Fragmented China," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-103/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Irina Slinko & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2003. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," Working Papers w0031, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Ruben Enikolopov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," Working Papers w0065, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1993. "Multinational Firms, Political Competition, and International Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(2), pages 347-63, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 185-205, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldbe & Giovanni Maggi, 1997. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 5942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, 2005. "The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 131-150, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Sonin, Konstantin, 2003. "Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 715-731, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Kee, Hiau Looi & Olarreaga, Marcelo & Silva, Peri, 2007. "Market access for sale," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 79-94, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS is also providing many rankings, for example of authors and institutions.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.