IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/car/ciorup/86-02.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Insurance in a Unionized Labour Market: An Empirical Test

Author

Listed:
  • Felice Martinello

Abstract

The hypothesis that employers insure their workers against unfavorable states is tested against the alternative hypothe sis that efficient but noninsuring contracts occur. Data on the Briti sh Columbian pulp and paper industry (January 1977 to April 1985) are used. The comparative statics predictions of the implicit contract m odel are also derived and tested against the data. When manhours is u sed to represent employment, the hypothesis of insurance cannot be re jected and the data generally support the predictions of the implicit contract model. When number of men is used to represent employment, the data are not as supportive of the model and the hypothesis that l abor is insured against movements in consumer prices can be rejected at high significance levels.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Felice Martinello, 1986. "Insurance in a Unionized Labour Market: An Empirical Test," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 86-02, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:car:ciorup:86-02
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Haupt, Stefan, 1998. "Testing incentives for illegal employment: Implicit contracts vs trade union bargaining," HWWA Discussion Papers 51, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    2. Haupt, Stefan, 1998. "Testing Incentives for Illegal Employment: Implicit Contracts vs Trade Union Bargaining," Discussion Paper Series 26209, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:car:ciorup:86-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Court Lindsay (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.