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Competition, Economic Profit, and Political Capture

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Abstract

This paper gives a revised theory of monopoly, on the assumption that the monopolist receives political favours in exchange for extending political support. In one case, the monopoly profit just equals the value of the monopoly's contribution to the government's support. Monopoly output may be higher or lower than the output associated with marginal-cost pricing, and higher or lower than this sector would supply in a reference economy operating under all-around perfect competition. The monopolist may also use more labour and/or capital, even if its output is lower. In general, the monopoly does not minimize the cost of its output, and it may waste resources in production, as well as in rent-seeking. A shift of product demand away from the monopoly does not necessarily cause the monopolist to release resources that it is wasting. On a more positive note, there are conditions under which the economy with one monopoly and one competitive sector will reach a second-best solution, or an optimum taking the level of monopoly profit as given, but these conditions are severe and the cost of monopoly may still be high.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Carson, 2002. "Competition, Economic Profit, and Political Capture," Carleton Economic Papers 02-09, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:02-09
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 1-8.
    2. Leibenstein, Harvey & Maital, Shlomo, 1992. "Empirical Estimation and Partitioning of X-Inefficiency: A Data-Envelopment Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 428-433, May.
    3. Cassing, James H & Hillman, Arye L, 1986. "Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 516-523, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Catherine E. A. Mulligan & Phil Godsiff, 2023. "Datalism and Data Monopolies in the Era of A.I.: A Research Agenda," Papers 2307.08049, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political capture; monopoly; competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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