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Tax Systems in the World - An Empirical Investigation into the Importance of Tax Bases, Collection Costs, and Political Regime

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Author Info
Lawrence W. Kenny () (University of Florida)
Stanley L. Winer () (Department of Economics, Carleton University)

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Abstract

There has been surprisingly little empirical work explaining why countries choose different bundles of taxes. Early research by Musgrave and Hinrichs focused on the amorphous distinction between direct and indirect taxes. More recent research has examined the use of trade taxes and inflation, with little appreciation for the fact that countries are choosing a complete revenue mix. We examine the determinants of tax composition in 100 countries using data averaged over the periods 1975-80, 1981-85, and 1986-92. The dependent variables are tax revenues from the different sources as fractions of total revenue (or of GDP), including personal income taxes, corporate taxes, social security & payroll taxes, domestic goods & services taxes, trade taxes and tax rates, property taxes, and nontax revenues from seigniorage and public enterprises. All tax sources have increasing marginal political costs attached to their use. Consequently, as the scale or size of total revenues increases, reliance on all revenue sources can be expected to increase, though some tax bases may be used more heavily than others. We find strong evidence supporting this scale effect. Our empirical analysis also provides strong support for the prediction that countries tend to rely more heavily on tax sources for which the base is relatively large, and there is evidence that the use of taxes that depend on widespread literacy increases as educational attainment rises. While an explanation of the tax mix that relies on economic variables measuring scale, tax bases, and administration and enforcement costs works reasonably well even in a diverse sample of countries, we find that tax composition also varies with the nature of the political regime. Socialist countries tend to make more use of corporate, sales, and excise tax sources than other regimes, perhaps due to the greater ease with which the activity of businesses can be monitored, a stronger ideological interest in taxing business, or a reduced need to use taxation of individuals to accomplish social goals. We also find that more repressive governments rely less on personal income taxation, possibly because this tax source requires a higher degree of voluntary compliance than other forms of taxation. At a general level, the results as a whole are of interest for at least two reasons. First, they add to the set of stylized facts that may serve as a basis for further theoretical work that can unify the experience of different countries around the world. Secondly, the ability to model the tax mix of a diverse sample of countries raises interesting questions about the possibilities for tax reform. To the extent that international differences in the mix of taxes are predictable, proposals for reform that do not take the underlying forces into account are likely to be unsuccessful, or may be very costly if they do succeed in altering the existing equilibrium.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number 01-03.

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Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: 01 May 2001
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Publication status: Published: Carleton Working Papers
Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:01-03

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Related research
Keywords: political economy of taxation; tax mix; tax bases; administration costs; political regime;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
H27 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other Sources of Revenue

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kenny, Lawrence W & Toma, Mark, 1997. " The Role of Tax Bases and Collections Costs in the Determination of Income Tax Rates, Seigniorage and Inflation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 75-90, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hettich, Walter & Winer, Stanley L, 1988. "Economic and Political Foundations of Tax Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 701-12, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gersovitz, Mark & Paxson, Christina H, 1996. "The Revenues and Expenditures of African Governments: Modalities and Consequences," Journal of African Economies, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 199-227, June.
  5. Habibi, Nader, 1994. "Budgetary policy and political liberty: A cross-sectional analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 579-586, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "Explaining fiscal policies and inflation in developing countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1, Supple), pages S16-S48, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Winer, Stanley L. & Hettich, Walter, 1991. "Debt and tariffs : An empirical investigation of the evolution of revenue systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 215-242, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hettich, W. & Winer, S.L., 1993. "The Political Economy of Taxation," Papers 8, Carleton - Business Administration.
    Other versions:
  9. Greenaway, David, 1985. "Trade Taxes as a," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 32(2), pages 205-08, June.
    Other versions:
  10. Kenny, Lawrence W, 1991. "Cross-Country Estimates of the Demand for Money and Its Components," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 696-705, October.
  11. Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1998. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," NBER Working Papers 6789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Poterba, James M & Rotemberg, Julio J, 1990. "Inflation and Taxation with Optimizing Governments," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(1), pages 1-18, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Aidt, T. & Jensen, P.S., 2007. "The Taxman Tools Up: An Event History Study of the Introduction of the Personal Income Tax in Western Europe, 1815-1941," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0766, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich, 2002. "The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters," Carleton Economic Papers 02-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. James B. Davies & Stanley L. Winer, 2008. "Closing the 49th Parallel: An Unexplored Episode in Canadian Economic and Political History," University of Western Ontario, RBC Financial Group Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20083, University of Western Ontario, RBC Financial Group Economic Policy Research Institute. [Downloadable!]
  4. Mehmet Tosun, 2006. "Explaining the Variation in Tax Structures in the MENA Region," Working Papers 06-018, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics & University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
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