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Rules, Politics and the Normative Analysis of Taxation

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Author Info
Walter Hettich () (Department of Economics, California State University)
Stanley L. Winer () (Department of Economics & School of Public Administration, Carleton University)

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Abstract

Taxation has been a much-discussed subject in the literature on economics and in writings on the role and meaning of the state. Over the centuries, many authors have put forward views of what qualifies as "good" taxation and what constitutes undesirable tax policy. Consensus on these issues has changed over time, depending on historical circumstances and prevailing modes of economic thinking. In this chapter, we look at analytical views that enjoy broad acceptance in the current literature on taxation. We call these views "rules" or "norms" of analysis. They represent patterns of thinking that have wide currency or that have become codified in the literature. The chapter describes eight of the most important rules or norms and then critically examines their validity in a framework that makes explicit allowance for collective choice. Our critique leads us to identify several shortcomings and limitations in existing patterns of thinking.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number 00-12.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Publication status: Published: Public Choice
Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:00-12

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Related research
Keywords: public economics; public finance; taxation; collective choice; rules;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H0 - Public Economics - - General
H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Herbert A. Simon, 1996. "The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262691914.
  2. Hamilton, Jonathan H & Slutsky, Steven, 2000. " Decentralizing Allocation and Distribution by Separation with Information Transfers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(3), pages 289-318. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Wolfgang Eggert, 1999. "Capital Tax Competition with Inefficient Government Spending," CoFE Discussion Paper 99-15, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hettich, W. & Winer, S.L., 1993. "The Political Economy of Taxation," Papers 8, Carleton - Business Administration.
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  7. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-77, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lockwood, Ben, 1992. "Commodity Tax Competition Under Destination and Origin Principles," CEPR Discussion Papers 733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Stephen Coate, 1999. "An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes," NBER Working Papers 7316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Boylan, Richard T & McKelvey, Richard D, 1995. "Voting over Economic Plans," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 860-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-10.


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