Municipal aggregation and retail competition in the Ohio energy sector
AbstractOhio allows communities to vote to aggregate the loads of individual consumers (unless they opt out) in order to seek a competitive energy supplier. Over 200 communities have voted to do this for electricity. By 2004 residential switching reached 69% in Cleveland territory (95% from municipal aggregation) but by 2006 had fallen to 8%. Savings are now small, but customer acquisition costs are low and the cost to consumers is negligible. Aggregation and retail competition have been thwarted by Rate Stabilization Plans holding incumbent utility prices below cost since 2006. In the Ohio gas sector, rate regulation has not discouraged aggregation and competition, but market prices falling below municipally negotiated rates can be politically embarrassing. How municipal aggregation would fare against individual choice in a market conducive to retail competition is an open question, but the policy deserves consideration elsewhere.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0739.
Date of creation: Aug 2007
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Municipal aggregation; retail competition; electricity; gas; Ohio; regulation.;
Other versions of this item:
- Stephen Littlechild, 2008. "Municipal aggregation and retail competition in the Ohio energy sector," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 164-194, October.
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-08-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2007-08-27 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2007-08-27 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2007-08-27 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
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