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A Competitive Fringe in the Shadow of a State Owned Incumbent: The Case of France

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Author Info
Glachant, J-M.
Finon, D.

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Abstract

We examine what kind of competitive fringe has been built in France around the State owned incumbent without destroying it or significantly weakening its dominant position; what impacts has this particular reform process on the market in which the incumbent monopolist is still overly dominant; and what more can be done to strengthen the opening of the market while staying in this typical French policy framework (no industrial restructuring and no forced divestiture by the monopolist). We wonder if a larger window of opportunity will open up at some later date for contesting the position of the monopolist, especially when investment in generation resumes.

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File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/publications/wp/ep75.pdf
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Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0524.

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Length: 31
Date of creation: May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0524

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. David M. Newbery, 2002. "Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262640481.
  2. Joskow, P.L., 2003. "The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the U.S," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0328, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Eduardo Martínez Chombo, 2009. "Sources of Over-Costs and Distortions in State-Owned Utilities in Mexico," Working Papers 2009-07, Banco de México. [Downloadable!]
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