The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem
AbstractThis paper describes global biodiversity conservation as a co-operative bargaining problem. We model an interdependent ‘technology rich’ North and a ‘gene rich’ South who must co-operate in the biotechnology sector in order to combine their unique and essential resources and maximise global surplus. Chief among the ideas presented here is that, in a manner similar to the ‘rational threats’ idea posited by Nash (1953), and in line with observations of pre-contractual bargaining over biodiversity conservation in Latin America (World Bank 2003), destruction of biological resources represents a real source of bargaining power to the South in determining the bargaining outcome. Not only this, but current institutional arrangements relevant to the biodiversity bargaining problem, namely the incremental cost approach enshrined in the CBD and IPRs for innovation enshrined in TRIPS, can be shown to offer a second-best solution. These arrangements may induce the strategic incentives in the game of surplus division.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0447.
Date of creation: Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
North-South bargaining; biodiversity conservation; biotechnology; Convention on Biodiversity (CBD); contracts; Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs);
Other versions of this item:
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- Q16 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - R&D; Agricultural Technology; Biofuels; Agricultural Extension Services
- Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply (the Commons)
- Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
- Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Susanne Droege & Birgit Soete, 2001. "Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, North-South Trade, and Biological Diversity," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(2), pages 149-163, June.
- Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,"
3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Goeschl, T. & Swanson, T., 2003.
"Pests, plagues, and patents,"
Open Access publications from University College London
http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
- King, K., 1994. "The Incremental Costs of Global Environmental Benefits," Papers 5, World Bank - Global Environment Facility.
- Ilhem Kassar & Pierre Lasserre, 2002.
"Species Preservation and Biodiversity Value: A Real Options Approach,"
Cahiers de recherche du DÃ©partement des sciences Ã©conomiques, UQAM
20-18, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Kassar, Ilhem & Lasserre, Pierre, 2004. "Species preservation and biodiversity value: a real options approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 857-879, September.
- Ilhem Kassar & Pierre Lasserre, 2002. "Species Preservation and Biodiversity Value: A Real Options Approach," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-82, CIRANO.
- Scott Barrett, 1994. "The biodiversity supergame," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(1), pages 111-122, February.
- Swanson, Timothy, 1996. "The reliance of northern economies on southern biodiversity: biodiversity as information," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-8, April.
- Timo Goeschl & Timothy Swanson, 2003. "On Biology and Technology: The Economics of Managing Biotechnologies," Working Papers 2003.42, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Timo Goeschl & Timothy Swanson, 2002. "The Social Value of Biodiversity for R&D," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(4), pages 477-504, August.
- Lutz-Alexander Bush & Shouyong Shi & Quan Wen, 1998. "Bargaining with Surplus Destruction," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 915-932, November.
- Polasky, Stephen & Costello, Christopher & McAusland, Carol, 2004. "On trade, land-use, and biodiversity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 911-925, September.
- Angelsen, Arild & Kaimowitz, David, 1999. "Rethinking the Causes of Deforestation: Lessons from Economic Models," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 14(1), pages 73-98, February.
- Tim Swanson & Ben Groom, 2012.
"Regulating Global Biodiversity: What is the Problem?,"
2012.31, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Tim Swanson & Ben Groom, 2012. "Regulating global biodiversity: what is the problem?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 114-138, Spring.
- Figuieres, Charles & Leplay, Solenn & Midler, Estelle & Thoyer, Sophie, 2012.
"The REDD Scheme to Curb Deforestation: A Well-designed System of Incentives?,"
Strategic Behavior and the Environment,
now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 239-257, September.
- Charles Figuières & Solenn Leplay & Estelle Midler & Sophie Thoyer, 2010. "The REDD scheme to curb deforestation: A well-designed system of incentives?," Working Papers 10-06, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2010.
- Oliver Deke, 2004. "Financing National Protected Area Networks Internationally � The Global Environment Facility as a Multilateral Mechanism of Transfer," Kiel Working Papers 1227, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Howard Cobb).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.