Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

‘Did English Generators Play Cournot? Capacity Withholding in the Electricity Pool’

Contents:

Author Info

  • Green, R.

Abstract

Electricity generators can raise the price of power by withholding their plant from the market. We discuss two ways in which this could have affected prices in the England and Wales Pool. Withholding low-cost capacity that should be generating will raise energy prices but make the pattern of generation less efficient. This pattern improved significantly after privatisation. Withholding capacity that was not expected to generate would raise the Capacity Payments based on spare capacity. On a multi-year basis, these did not usually exceed ‘competitive’ levels, the cost of keeping stations open. The evidence for large-scale capacity withholding is weak.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/publications/wp/ep41.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Howard Cobb)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0425.

as in new window
Length: 21
Date of creation: Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0425

Note: CMI41, IO
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

Related research

Keywords: Electricity prices; Cournot competition; capacity withholding;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Roques, Fabien A., 2008. "Market design for generation adequacy: Healing causes rather than symptoms," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 171-183, September.
  2. Milstein, Irena & Tishler, Asher, 2012. "The inevitability of capacity underinvestment in competitive electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 62-77.
  3. Tishler, Asher & Milstein, Irena & Woo, Chi-Keung, 2008. "Capacity commitment and price volatility in a competitive electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1625-1647, July.
  4. Janssen, Matthias & Wobben, Magnus, 2008. "Electricity pricing and market power: Evidence from Germany," CAWM Discussion Papers 9, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM), University of Münster.
  5. Roques, F. & Newbery, D.M. & Nuttall, W.J., 2004. "Generation Adequacy and Investment Incentives in Britain: from the Pool to NETA," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0459, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  6. Janssen, Matthias & Wobben, Magnus, 2008. "Electricity Pricing and Market Power - Evidence from Germany," MPRA Paper 11400, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Sweeting, A., 2004. "Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995-2000," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0455, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0425. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Howard Cobb).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.