Introducing Competition in the French Electricity Supply Industry: The Destabilisation of a Public Hierarchy in an Open Institutional Environment
AbstractThe French electricity supply industry is characterized by a vertically integrated monopoly and public ownership and when the government introduced market rules, it was with the aim of preserving the integration of the public incumbent as a national champion. This had two paradoxical effects in favour of competition development and the building of safeguards for entrants: 1/ the creation of a credible regulatory governance structure with effective power of control on network access which promoted market-rules, and the creation of a power exchange for balancing the incumbent’s dominant position; 2/ the credibility of the regulatory framework by the self-control of the incumbent in the use of its dominant position and on the capture of the regulator. These two effects result from the influence of the European institutional environment, in particular the intensive scrutiny of the European Commission, which is superposed on the national one.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0314.
Date of creation: Feb 2003
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-02-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2003-02-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2003-02-18 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-IND-2003-02-20 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brunekreeft, Gert & Keller, Katja, 2000. "The electricity supply industry in Germany: market power or power of the market?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 15-29, March.
- Adrien de Hauteclocque & Yannick Perez, 2011. "Law & Economics Perspectives on Electricity Regulation," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/21, European University Institute.
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