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Personality Preferences and Pre-Commitment: Behavioral Explanations in Ultimatum Games

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Author Info

  • Pamela M. Schmitt

    (U. S. Naval Academy)

  • Robert S. Shupp

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Ball State University)

  • Kurtis J. Swope

    ()
    (U. S. Naval Academy)

  • Justin Mayer

    (U. S. Naval Academy)

Abstract

This paper uses responder pre-commitment and psychological type, as measured by the Myers- Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), to gain insight into subject behavior in a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment. Three experiment design details are noteworthy: (1) one design requires responders to make a nonbinding pre-commitment rejection level prior to seeing the offer, (2) one design requires responders to make a binding pre-commitment rejection level, and (3) one design includes a third person (or “hostage”) who makes no decision, but whose payment depends on the proposal being accepted. Offers are higher when proposers know that responders make a binding pre-commitment to reject but are not different when a hostage is present. Responders make lower pre-commitments when they are binding and when a hostage is present. Behavior in our experiment is generally consistent with hypotheses based on theoretical underpinnings of the MBTI and its descriptions of psychological type.

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File URL: http://econfac.iweb.bsu.edu/research/workingpapers/bsuecwp200503schmitt.pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Ball State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 200503.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision: May 2005
Handle: RePEc:bsu:wpaper:200503

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Keywords: Ultimatum game; preferences; personality;

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  1. Avner Ben-Ner & Famin Kong & Louis Putterman & Dan Magan, . "Reciprocity in a Two-Part Dictator Game," Working Papers, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus) 0902, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
  2. Boone, Christophe & De Brabander, Bert & van Witteloostuijn, Arjen, 1999. "The impact of personality on behavior in five Prisoner's Dilemma games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 343-377, June.
  3. Caplan, Bryan, 2003. "Stigler-Becker versus Myers-Briggs: why preference-based explanations are scientifically meaningful and empirically important," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 391-405, April.
  4. Solnick, Sara J, 2001. "Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 189-200, April.
  5. Stigler, George J & Becker, Gary S, 1977. "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 76-90, March.
  6. Eckel, Catherine C & Grossman, Philip J, 2001. "Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 171-88, April.
  7. John Kagel & Katherine Wolfe, 2001. "Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 203-219, December.
  8. Ben-Ner, Avner & Kong, Fanmin & Putterman, Louis, 2004. "Share and share alike? Gender-pairing, personality, and cognitive ability as determinants of giving," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 581-589, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Kurtis J. Swope & John Cadigan & Pamela M. Schmitt & Robert S. Shupp, 2005. "Personality Preferences in Laboratory Economics Experiments," Working Papers, Ball State University, Department of Economics 200507, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2005.

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