Partial Delegation in a Model of Currency Crisis
AbstractStressing the inßuence of expected devaluation on currency crises, this paper shows that, in a fixed exchange-rate system with an escape clause, partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to an inßation-averse central banker reduces the probability of crisis.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University in its series Public Policy Discussion Papers with number 02-07.
Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2002
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK
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