Price Cap, Revenue Sharing and Information Acquisition
AbstractWe study the incentives of regulated firms to acquire costly information under price cap regulation.We show that revenue sharing plans, in the spirit proposed by Sappington and Weisman(1996), can provide greater incentives for information acquisition than pure price capping and increase social welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University in its series Economics and Finance Discussion Papers with number 04-04.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK
Other versions of this item:
- Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2004. "Price Cap, Revenue Sharing and Information Acquisition," Public Policy Discussion Papers 04-04, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
- NEP-ACC-2004-07-11 (Accounting & Auditing)
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- NEP-COM-2004-07-11 (Industrial Competition)
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